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to selectively impair goal-directed function, rather than pro-
moting habitual responding. It appears to do so particularly 
after nonrewards, and this may be mediated by the effects 
of alcohol on more general cognitive functions subserved by 
the prefrontal cortex.  © 2014 S. Karger AG, Basel 
 Introduction 
 Substance dependence is characterized by maladaptive 
choices that contrast with the subjects’ explicitly stated 
desires, such as the failure to abstain despite the desire to 
quit drinking. This inflexible and compulsive behavior in 
addiction suggests a failure or disruption of several com-
ponents of the underlying decision-making systems.
 Two well-defined components of decision-making 
have been computationally characterized. On the one 
hand, a flexible, goal-directed, model-based planning sys-
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 Abstract 
 Background: Human and animal work suggests a shift from 
goal-directed to habitual decision-making in addiction. 
However, the evidence for this in human alcohol depen-
dence is as yet inconclusive.  Methods: Twenty-six healthy 
controls and 26 recently detoxified alcohol-dependent pa-
tients underwent behavioral testing with a 2-step task de-
signed to disentangle goal-directed and habitual response 
patterns.  Results: Alcohol-dependent patients showed less 
evidence of goal-directed choices than healthy controls, par-
ticularly after losses. There was no difference in the strength 
of the habitual component. The group differences did not 
survive controlling for performance on the Digit Symbol 
Substitution Task.  Conclusion: Chronic alcohol use appears 
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tem explicitly considers the consequences of actions  [1] . 
It is ‘model-based’ in that it relies on a model of the world 
(in simple experiments often just the action-outcome 
contingencies), and then deduces from this model the 
best sequence of actions. Although it is computationally 
costly, requiring the explicit consideration of future out-
comes, it can be immediately sensitive to environmental 
changes and lead to rapid behavioral adaptation. In paral-
lel, a more rigid habitual system repeats actions that were 
in the past associated with reward  [2, 3] . The learning 
process that leads to habits relies on iterative updates of 
expectations through putatively dopaminergic  [4–6] pre-
diction errors, but unlike the goal-directed system does 
not rely on an explicit model. Hence, it is termed model-
free. Because it relies on iterative updating, it is also slow, 
requiring substantial and repeated experience before be-
havioral adjustments. Tasks that require rapid shifting 
between behavioral strategies have been used to distin-
guish model-based and model-free components behav-
iorally and neurobiologically in humans and animals. Ex-
amples of such tasks are devaluation or motivational shift 
experiments, whereby the signature of habitual respond-
ing is a continued responding for an outcome that is no 
longer desired. This is reminiscent of drug taking persist-
ing in the face of negative consequences.
 Numerous studies in animals have shown that drugs 
of abuse shift the balance towards habits. Studies using for 
instance devaluation paradigms  [4–7] have shown persis-
tence of responding increasing with alcohol. The process-
es that speed up habituation have been suggested to also 
facilitate transformation into compulsions  [8–13] . Work 
in humans with addictions has also shown evidence of 
inflexible choices, even in terms of non-drug-related re-
wards such as monetary gains. For instance, alcohol-  [14] 
and stimulant-dependent  [15–17] patients show impair-
ments in shifting their responses in probabilistic reversal 
learning and fail to adapt their responses after errors in 
stop signal tasks  [18, 19] . Moreover shifts towards auto-
matic action tendencies temporally precede relapses  [20] 
and can be trained to improve treatment outcome  [21] . 
There have also been attempts to directly examine how 
substance dependence affects the relationship between 
goal-directed and habitual control in humans. A satiety 
devaluation paradigm did not reveal evidence of habitual 
responding for either cigarettes or chocolate in smokers, 
suggesting that not all responses for drug-related stimuli 
are necessarily habitual in drug users  [22] . Interestingly, 
however, alcohol expectancy  [23] and acute alcohol ad-
ministration  [24] did reduce the effect of satiety devalua-
tion, suggesting that alcohol can specifically impair goal-
directed decisions. Indeed, the goal-directed system is 
likely to depend on the kind of cognitive processes that 
are known to be impaired by alcohol  [25, 26] . Sjoerds et 
al. [27] used an instructed devaluation in a slip of action 
tasks which involves complex relationships between 
stimuli, outcomes and responses. They found evidence 
for a shift towards habits in alcohol-dependent patients, 
which was accompanied by an increased functional mag-
netic resonance imaging signal in habit-related areas like 
the posterior putamen  [28] and a decreased signal in goal-
directed ventromedial prefrontal and anterior putamen 
areas  [29–31] , which parallels findings in animals  [32] .
 Devaluation experiments involve single, sudden and 
large changes. On the one hand, these changes are obvi-
ous to human subjects and such salient changes might 
therefore lead to potent re-engagement of flexible goal-
directed behavior. On the other hand, the slip of action 
task is very complex, and the performance of goal-direct-
ed decisions might be hampered by impairments affect-
ing upstream cognitive functions including working 
memory  [33] . We here use a third type of task  [31] that 
has been developed based on computational arguments 
about the statistical efficiency of habitual and goal-direct-
ed systems  [3] . It examines the relative contributions of 
habitual and goal-directed choices using continuous, 
subtle valuation shifts rather than few large or instructed 
ones. This task is also particular in that it allows us to 
compare the consequences of gains and nongains. Fur-
thermore, given the sensitivity of goal-directed choices to 
cognitive load  [25] and the recently reported importance 
of other cognitive measures  [33, 34] , we also examine 
whether any effects of alcohol dependence on the struc-
ture of decision-making might be accounted for by differ-
ences in more general cognitive measures. 
 Methods 
 Twenty-six recently detoxified alcohol-dependent patients (5 
females) and 26 healthy comparison subjects (5 females) partici-
pated in this study. Demographic and clinical group characteris-
tics of the final sample are outlined in  table  1 . Groups were 
matched for age, gender and years of education. All participants 
were examined for past and present psychiatric disorders using 
the Screening Version of the Structured Clinical Interview for 
DSM-IV  [35] . All patients fulfilled DSM-IV criteria for alcohol 
dependence without axis I comorbidity. The days of alcohol ab-
stinence before study participation in the patient group ranged 
from 2 to 39 with a mean of 15.1 ± 10.4 days. All healthy controls 
had no current or past major psychiatric disorder. All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were also screened 
for neurological diseases. After detailed verbal and written in-
struction on the procedures of the study, participants gave their 
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 Table 1.  Demographic and clinical characteristics of 26 patients and 26 matched controls
Number Mean t values p
ALC HC A LC HC
Age, years 26 26 44.0 43.3 t50 = 0.304 0.76
Education, years 26 25 11.0 11.5 t49 = 1.39 0.17
Verbal IQ (WST) 25 26 100.5 106.0 t49 = 1.92 0.061
Cognitive speed (DSST) 25 24 59.0 69.9 t47 = 2.18 0.035
Verbal working memory (DS) 25 25 6.8 7.5 t48 = 1.06 0.29
Executive functioning (TMT-A) 19 24 33.5 32.4 t41 = 0.32 0.75
Executive functioning (TMT-B) 19 24 74.5 72.3 t41 = 0.18 0.86
Verbal memory (word list) 19 24 8.2 8.9 t41 = 1.14 0.26
 Each group included 5 females. Comparisons are based on independent-sample t tests. p values indicating 
statistical significance at a level less than 0.05 are displayed in italics.
ALC = Alcohol-dependent patients; HC = healthy controls; verbal IQ assessed by German vocabulary test 
(Wortschatztest [39]); cognitive speed assessed by Digit Symbol Substitution Test (DSST) from Wechsler WAIS-
R [40]; verbal working memory assessed by digit span (DS) backwards test [40]; executive functioning assessed 
by trail making test (TMT) A and B [41]; verbal memory assessed by word list from the Consortium to Establish 
a Registry for Alzheimer’s Disease [42].
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 Fig. 1.  a Trial configuration for the experiment. Each trial con-
sisted of 2 different stages and each stage involved a choice between 
2 stimuli. In the first stage, subjects chose between 2 abstract stim-
uli on a gray background. The chosen stimulus was highlighted by 
a red frame and moved to the top of the screen, where it remained 
visible for 1.5 s; at the same time, the other stimulus faded away. 
Subjects then reached a subsequent second stage. Here subjects 
saw 1 of 2 further pairs of colored stimuli and again chose between 
these. The monetary outcome following this second-stage choice 
(gain or no gain of 20 cent) was then presented centrally on the 
screen.  b One pair of colored second-stage stimuli occurred com-
monly (on 70% of trials; ‘common trials’) after choice of one first-
stage gray stimulus, while the other second-stage pair was equally 
strongly associated with the other first-stage stimulus (common). 
On the remaining 30% of trials, the chosen first-stage option re-
sulted in a transition to the other second-stage stimulus pair (rare). 
 c Reinforcement probabilities for each second-stage stimulus 
changed slowly and independently according to gaussian random 
walks with reflecting boundaries at 0.25 and 0.75. Win probabili-
ties are displayed as a function of trial number, according to Daw 
et al.  [31] . 
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written informed consent. The study was approved by the local 
ethics committee of Charité Universitätmedizin Berlin and Uni-
versitätklinikum Dresden. 
 Task and Procedure 
 All participants underwent neuropsychological testing includ-
ing standard tests assessing crystallized intelligence, cognitive 
speed, memory and executive functioning ( table 1 ). Participants 
additionally performed the 2-stage Markov decision task as de-
scribed by Daw et al.  [31] in 2011 (see  fig. 1 for a detailed task de-
scription). 
 The task was reprogrammed in MATLAB, using the Psycho-
physics Toolbox extensions  [36, 37] and used different stimuli. 
Prior to the experiment, participants were explicitly informed 
about the task structure. Critically, the very detailed subject in-
structions were carefully translated from the English version. Par-
ticipants were told that the transition matrix from first-step choic-
es to second stages would stay constant and that the selection of 
one stimulus on the first stage would lead to a particular stimulus 
pair on the second stage more often than it would lead to the oth-
er second-stage stimulus pair. Participants were instructed that 
second-stage reward probabilities were independent of each other 
and would slowly change over the course of the experiment. Par-
ticipants were familiarized with the paradigm before the task by 
performing a shortened version of the paradigm (50 trials) with 
different reinforcement probabilities and a different stimulus set. 
They were instructed to maximize their monetary outcome 
throughout the experiment. Participants’ overall payout was EUR 
13 plus the accumulated reward of one third of all trials. The max-
imal payout was limited to EUR 20. The task consisted of 201 tri-
als. Trials were separated by an exponentially distributed inter-
trial interval, ranging between 1 and 7 s. The maximum response 
time was 2 s for first- and for second-stage choices. If participants 
failed to make a response in this time window, the German phrase 
for ‘too slow!’ appeared on the screen for 2 s, and the trial was 
aborted. The two stimuli at the first and second stage were as-
signed randomly between left and right from trial to trial. 
 Behavioral Analysis 
 We performed a simplified analysis focusing only on first-stage 
choices. Model-based and model-free strategies predict different 
patterns of first-stage choices. A model-free strategy predicts
purely reinforcement-guided action selection: first-stage choices 
should be repeated after a previous trial’s second-stage choice had 
resulted in reward whereas a first-stage switch should occur after 
a previous trial had ended up being not rewarded. Thus, model-
free action selection should occur irrespectively of whether the 
transition to the second stage in the previous trial was a common 
or a rare one ( fig. 2 a). In contrast, model-based action selection 
includes the consideration of the task structure in its transition. 
This results in an inverted response behavior following rare trials. 
Consider a trial in which a first-stage response uncharacteristi-
cally results in a second-stage stimulus pair to which it usually does 
not lead (rare) and in which the second-stage selection is then re-
warded. Model-based action selection would then predict a de-
creased probability of choosing this first-stage stimulus again, as 
the selection of the first-stage stimulus that has initially not been 
chosen has a higher likelihood of leading to the rewarded second-
stage stimulus pair (common;  fig. 2 b). 
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 Fig. 2. First-stage behavior as a function of 
reward and frequency of the previous trial 
for pure model-free versus pure model-
based strategies. A pure model-free deci-
sion-making strategy would lead to a main 
effect of reward ( a ), but no effect of or in-
teraction with frequency, while a pure 
model-based decision strategy would lead 
to an interaction between reward and fre-
quency without a main effect of reward ( b ). 
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 The major aim of this investigation was to specifically assess 
whether alcohol-dependent patients displayed a shift from mod-
el-based to model-free control. For this purpose we calculated 2 
individual scores, one for model-based and one for model-free 
control. Individual model-free scores reflected the individual 
main effect of reward (% reward common + % rewarded rare – 
% unrewarded common – % unrewarded rare), whereas indi-
vidual scores for model-based control reflected the interaction 
between transition frequency and reward (% reward common + 
% unrewarded rare – % rewarded rare – % unrewarded com-
mon). We computed a 1-tailed t test in each group (which com-
pares both scores in each group against zero), in order to test 
whether both decision-making systems were evident within each 
group.
 We then conducted independent-samples t tests to assess our a 
priori hypotheses that model-free contributions would be larger in 
alcohol-dependent patients than in healthy controls and converse-
ly that model-based contributions would be larger in healthy con-
trols than in alcohol-dependent patients. As we had explicit hy-
potheses on the direction of within-group and between-group ef-
fects of both model-free and model-based control we tested all 
comparisons regarding these hypotheses against a 1-tailed crite-
rion.
 In order to assess whether the neuropsychological variable that 
differed between groups (Digit Symbol Substitution Test, DSST) 
had an influence on model-free or model-based control we first 
regressed the outcome variables (total earnings and individual 
model-based scores) onto the neuropsychological variable, and 
performed independent-samples t tests on the residuals. All statis-
tical analyses were performed using MATLAB version R2007a 
 [38] .
 Results 
 Participants 
 Participant characteristics are shown in  table  1 . Pa-
tients and controls were matched for age, sex and educa-
tion. Nevertheless, there was a significant difference in 
one measure of cognitive functioning (DSST, p < 0.05), 
and groups showed a tendency towards differing on ver-
bal IQ (German vocabulary test, Wortschatztest: p = 
0.061). 
 Participants rarely missed any responses (mean = 
1.8%, SD = 2.43%). Missed trials were omitted from anal-
ysis. Patients and controls did not differ in their average 
stay/switch behavior at the first stage (no group differ-
ence in overall probability of stay/switch t 50 = 0.65, p = 
0.52). 
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 Fig. 3. Observed first-stage behavior as a function of reward and frequency of the previous trial for healthy con-
trols ( a ) and alcohol-dependent patients ( b ). Error bars represent standard errors of means.  c Standardized dif-
ferences in stay probabilities between healthy controls and alcohol-dependent patients.  
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 Model-Free Choices 
 Both groups showed significant model-free influences 
in their choice behavior (model-free scores greater than 
zero, alcohol-dependent patient 1-tailed t test, t 25 = 5.03, 
p < 0.001; healthy control 1-tailed t test, t 25 = 4.1 p < 
0.001). Thus, subjects tended to choose the same first-
stage stimulus when rewarded in the previous trial, but 
switched to the opposing first-stage stimulus when not 
rewarded. Against our prediction, patients did not show 
a stronger model-free component (individual model-free 
scores alcohol-dependent patients vs. healthy controls 
1-tailed t test, t 50 = 1.08, p = 0.14). 
 Model-Based Choices 
 Goal-directed components were present in both 
groups (individual model-based score greater than 
zero; 1-tailed tests: healthy control  t 25 = 3.32, p < 0.001, 
alcohol-dependent patient t 25 = 1.95, p < 0.05). Hence, 
switches tended to occur when the outcome of the pre-
vious trial was a reward, but the transition rare, or when 
the outcome was a nonreward and the transition a com-
mon one. Healthy controls used significantly more 
model-based strategies than alcohol-dependent pa-
tients, as indicated by between-group differences in in-
dividual model-based scores (t 50 = 1.90, p < 0.05, 
1-tailed).
 Figure 3 displays the stay probabilities for healthy 
controls ( fig.  3 a), alcohol-dependent patients ( fig.  3 b) 
and between-group differences in stay probabilities for 
all 4 trial types ( fig. 3 c). Visual inspection suggests that 
the groups mainly differed in stay probabilities after un-
rewarded trials. In order to test for differential between-
group differences in model-based choice behavior for 
unrewarded and rewarded trials, we calculated individ-
ual model-based scores for unrewarded and rewarded 
trials separately and used independent-sample t tests to 
compare these between groups. These post hoc t tests 
confirmed that controls modulated their responses after 
losses according to a model-based strategy (i.e. were 
sensitive to transition frequency) more than patients 
(1-tailed test: t 50 = 2.27, p < 0.05). However, model-
based control after rewarded trials was not greater in 
controls than patients (1-tailed test: t 50 = 0.57, p = 0.28). 
Thus, the difference in terms of model-free/model-
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based choices between controls and patients was driven 
by a failure of goal-directed control after nonrewards in 
patients. 
 On average, subjects earned EUR 16.4 (total range 
13.60–18.00). Patients earned less money than controls 
(2-tailed t test, t 50 = 2.53, p < 0.05,  fig. 4 a). As the optimal 
response strategy exploits the structure of the task, mod-
el-based responding was expected to improve the overall 
outcome. Individual model-based scores were indeed 
positively correlated with the total monetary outcome 
(Pearson’s r = 0.33, p < 0.05;  fig. 4 b). As expected, total 
outcome was not related to the score for model-free be-
havior (Pearson’s r = –0.13, p = 0.36). However, the group 
differences in earnings remained marginally significant 
after correcting for model-based scores (t 47 = 1.96, p = 
0.06), indicating that goal-directedness only partially ac-
counted for between-group differences in total monetary 
outcome ( fig. 4 c).
 Effect of Cognitive Measures on Model-Based Behavior 
 Despite carefully matching for education, groups dif-
fered on the DSST – a measure of cognitive speed ( ta-
ble 1 ). We therefore asked whether the apparent group 
differences in model-based reasoning might instead be 
explained by group differences in the DSST. To correct 
for the DSST, we again calculated 1-tailed independent-
samples t tests after regressing out individual DSST 
scores. Although patients continued to be less model 
based, this correction removed the significant group dif-
ference (t 47 = 1.13, p = 0.13;  fig. 5 a: group differences in 
model-based scores,  fig. 5 b: model-based scores correct-
ed for DSST).
 Discussion 
 The current study suggests a disruption of model-based 
choice behavior in alcohol-dependent patients. Impor-
tantly, we found no difference in the strength of model-free 
choice tendencies, and the disruption appears to be present 
after nonreward outcomes only. Despite carefully match-
ing patients for educational level, patients and controls dif-
fered on one measure of cognitive speed. Patients were less 
model based than controls even after controlling for this, 
but the difference was no longer significant (p = 0.13). 
 The results are in line with theories suggesting a shift 
from controlled, goal-directed (outcome-guided) to au-
tomatic, habitual (stimulus-guided) decision-making in 
substance dependence  [8–11] . They also speak to the crit-
ical question of whether chronic drug intake affects the 
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goal-directed or the habitual system, or both  [13, 43] . 
Crucially, inflexible, habitual action tendencies in sub-
stance dependence could derive from either an overactive 
habit system or an underactive goal-directed system or a 
change in the balance between these two systems  [44] . 
Nonsequential tasks, such as devaluation paradigms, can-
not address this question as they do not allow specifica-
tions on whether habitual action tendencies rather rely on 
amplified stimulus-response associations (habit system) 
or on an impairment to update or modify action-outcome 
contingencies (goal-directed system), or a combination 
of both. Thus, we here used a Markov decision task which 
allows precise specifications on the individual contribu-
tion of each system on decision-making. The results pre-
sented here suggest mainly an effect on goal-directed 
choices, particularly after nonrewards. This is in line with 
data showing orbitofrontal  [45, 46] and action-outcome 
impairments in substance dependence  [13] and with ac-
counts emphasizing the importance of reasserting goal-
directed control after losses or punishment  [7, 47–49] . 
Interestingly, administration of  L -dopa in this task selec-
tively enhances goal-directed action selection on unre-
warded trials  [50] . This may speak to the profound al-
terations in the dopaminergic system in addiction  [51–
53] . Learning from nonrewards is known to rely on D 2 
receptors in the indirect, inhibitory loop of the basal gan-
glia  [54, 55] . While this has mainly been examined in the 
context of habitual, prediction-error-based learning, 
Frank’s model also provides routes for influences on the 
prefrontal cortex via internal actions that update working 
memory  [56] . 
 The study identified a difference in the DSST between 
patients matched for educational level. This finding is in 
line with other studies demonstrating deficits in the DSST 
in alcohol-dependent patients  [57, 58] and addiction dis-
orders are well known not only to relate to striatal chang-
es, but also decreased activation in the prefrontal cortex 
 [53] . This may hint at an effect of alcohol on more gen-
eral measures of cognitive functioning  [58] . Goal-direct-
ed control has also been associated with prefrontal areas 
 [27, 59, 60] . This raises the question of whether drugs di-
rectly affect goal-directed choices or do so only second-
arily to their effects on other, more general cognitive 
functions. It will be important to also correct carefully for 
other measures of global function, such as working mem-
ory  [25] . Indeed, confounding factors from even further 
afield may play a role, too. Stress, for instance, is known 
to affect the deployment of the goal-directed system  [61] 
by decreasing activity of prefrontal regions  [62] , and it is 
not entirely implausible that patients may have felt more 
stressed during the experiment than controls. Moreover, 
it has been demonstrated that trait impulsivity is linked 
to decreased goal-directed control  [63] . Given the finding 
that self-reported impulsivity tends to be increased in 
substance-dependent subjects  [64, 65] , this might be an-
other potential mediator for the effects reported here.
 We did not find a difference in model-free learning. 
Very detailed computational theories map phasic dopa-
mine signals decisively onto model-free learning  [66–69] . 
Given the impact of drugs of abuse on dopamine  [70] , the 
absence of this finding is rather striking. However, the 
failure to observe an effect on model-free learning is a 
negative effect. Similarly, the study was powered to detect 
a group difference in either of the two components, but 
not a difference between them, and we therefore did not 
ask whether the difference in the model-based compo-
nent was larger than the difference in the model-free 
component. Hence these findings need to be treated with 
caution and require replication. Furthermore, while ani-
mal studies have convincingly shown a shift towards 
model-free choices in addiction, and indeed with alcohol 
 [4, 5, 7] , there have been only limited investigations to 
substantiate this in humans so far  [23, 27] . One reason 
may be that it has been difficult to measure these two sys-
tems in humans and often has required rather laborious 
tasks involving extended training  [71, 72] . While the cur-
rent task is more subtle and measures devaluation in a 
more continuous way, one caveat is that it is not clear 
whether it fully differentiates between goal-directed and 
habitual components at a neurobiological level  [31] . 
Moreover, it is yet unclear how different paradigms that 
have been designed to investigate dual-control mecha-
nisms in humans indeed do examine a common psycho-
logical and neurobiological construct. Thus, further re-
search should investigate within-subject correlations be-
tween performance in different dual-control tasks, such 
as paradigms that devalued outcomes by satiation  [24, 61, 
71] or by omission  [72] and sequential learning tasks such 
as the 2-step task  [31] or even more complex Marcov de-
cision tasks  [73] .
 We found that patients earned slightly less than con-
trols. As a goal-directed strategy earns more, we initially 
thought this would be explained by the measure of goal-
directedness. This was not so, suggesting that there might 
be further factors, possibly beyond the current model-
free/model-based account affecting subjects’ perfor-
mance on the task. However, this need not necessarily be 
the case and in the future could be addressed by fitting the 
computational models of Daw et al.  [31] and examining 
specifically the softmax terms. 
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 Finally, it is yet unclear whether disruption in model-
based control in alcohol-dependent subjects is caused by 
excessive chronic alcohol intake or rather reflects a pre-
disposition to alcohol abuse. Evidence for alcohol-in-
duced disruption of goal-directed behavior comes from 
demonstrations of devaluation insensitivity after chronic 
alcohol intake in rodents  [4] and humans revealing dis-
ruption of goal-directed behavior  [24] and inhibitory 
top-down control  [74] after acute alcohol administration. 
As it has been shown that impairments in cognitive con-
trol serve as a vulnerability marker for an increased risk 
for substance dependence  [65, 75–77] , further research 
should use longitudinal designs in order to answer this 
chicken-and-egg question.
 In conclusion, we have shown rather selective and spe-
cific effects of chronic alcohol intake on model-based rea-
soning, and highlighted that this might arise from the im-
pact of chronic alcohol intake on more general cognitive 
functions. Further research should pay detailed attention 
to how impairments in the goal-directed system are re-
lated to prefrontal and cognitive functioning.
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